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Expert Systems and AI-Based Decision Support 
in Auditing: Progress and Perspectives † 
William E. McCarthy 
Michigan State University 
Eric Denna 
Brigham Young University 
Graham Gal 
University of  Massachusetts 
When all the AI rhetoric is boiled away, expert systems are simply com 
puter programs much like general ledger packages or even like video 
games. Writing a new payroll program in COBOL is not research, and 
neither is building another auditing expert system. 
1. Introduction 
Since the development of  AUDITOR at Illinois, there have been a num-
ber of  auditing expert systems designed and built by both academics and ac-
counting professionals.  For surveys of  this work, see Messier and Hansen 
[1987], Gal and Steinbart [1987], Bailey, Hackenbrack, De, and Dillard [1987], 
and Bailey, Graham, and Hansen [1988]. However, as encapsulated by the 
statement above, a continuing criticism of  this work (indeed, a criticism of 
any knowledge-based work in accounting) is that it constitutes more devel-
opment than research. In this paper, we contend that such blanket criticisms 
are unfounded  and are in fact  more attributable to a critic's lack of  schooling 
in computer science than to any conceptual shortcomings in the actual sys-
tems research methods. More specifically,  we will look at several auditing 
expert systems and evaluate them in terms of  some informally  developed dif-
ferentiation  heuristics, heuristics whose rationale depends heavily on the work 
of  March [1988] and Cohen and Howe [1988]. We will also try to chart new 
directions for  research in knowledge-based auditing systems. Our central pur-
pose throughout this paper is to try to develop a framework  of  analysis so 
that when someone proposes a new audit expert system or enhancements 
to an existing audit expert system, we can type its contribution as either pri-
marily research or primarily development or both. 
†Support in the development and preparation of  this paper was provided by the Department of 
Accounting at Michigan State University and Arthur Andersen & Co. Steve Rockwell provided 
numerous comments and criticisms. 
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The organization of  the paper is as follows.  Section two will explore the 
cognitive modeling rationale for  Al-based research in auditing. This reason-
ing is critical to our analysis framework,  but it has been explicated in detail 
elsewhere. It will only be reviewed and summarized here. Section three will 
explore the software  engineering legitimacy of  knowledge-based audit sys-
tems, i.e., a rationale that is quite a bit different  from  the cognitive modeling 
approach of  most accounting researchers. This section will explore that ra-
tionale as adapted from  a framework  developed by March [1988] and aug-
mented by other considerations gleaned from  the work of  researchers such 
as Cohen and Howe [1988]. The three subsections of  this software  engineering 
segment will address in order: (a) the March framework,  (b) a set of  argu-
ments concerning domain specificity  and maturity of  the research field,  and 
(c) some considerations involved in deciding whether to build an entire sys-
tem or to prototype just a part of  it. Section four  will explore time-lined de-
velopment of  four  academic audit expert systems and contrast their research 
content with that of  three bogus projects. The rationale developed previ-
ously in both sections two and three will be used in the comparison of  these 
four  real systems and three straw men. Section five  will explore the perspective 
of  the audit practitioners in AI tool development, and it will examine briefly 
areas where academics and practitioners can work together. Section six will 
finish  the paper with a summary of  our arguments. 
2. Cognitive Modeling Rationale 
A central theme which underlies the discipline of  accounting is the be-
lief  that accounting information  influences  decision making processes. This 
orientation has led both academicians and practitioners to be concerned 
with improving decisions that fall  within the accounting domain. There are 
basically three different  approaches that can be used to improve a decision. 
The first  is to provide better information.  A second is to train the decision 
maker to use the current information  set more effectively.  Finally, the deci-
sion maker can be replaced with a device that produces a consistent decision 
according to some prescribed model [Libby, 1981]. An initial issue that must 
be resolved prior to taking any of  these actions is to understand the current 
approach used to make the decision in question so that deficiencies,  if  they 
exist, can be evaluated. As a group, the decisions made by auditors have been 
used as the primary focus  of  a number of  projects as accounting researchers 
seek to understand the auditing decision process. In recent years, the infor-
mation-processing paradigm has been used in an increasing number of  these 
projects as researchers seek to uncover different  aspects of  the auditing de-
cision process. 
When auditors make a decision concerning the state of  internal controls 
or the importance of  a particular account balance to the completed financial 
statements, they must collect information,  combine it using some process, 
and then finally  produce a decision. The information-processing  paradigm of-
fers  a number of  different  approaches to investigate these activities. A re-
searcher can ask auditors to verbalize what they are doing as they make 
decisions. These verbal reports [Ericsson and Simon, 1980] provide a trace 
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of  the steps that the auditor goes through and thus give insights into the in-
formation  used, the combination processes employed, and the decisions pro-
duced. This verbal trace of  problem solving activities becomes a model of  the 
underlying cognitive process. A difficulty  with this approach is that it is hard 
to verify  the model. This deficiency  has led certain accounting researchers 
to use tools and methods borrowed from  computer science in an attempt to 
implement the model of  the auditor on a computer in the form  of  a program 
that simulates the auditor's decision process. The rationale for  building these 
systems is that the researcher now has a program which contains a cogni-
tive model of  the decision maker and can proceed with an assessment of  which 
of  the three approaches mentioned above would be appropriate to improve 
the decision. That is, should we change the information  or should we train 
auditors to use a different  process or finally  should we use the expert system 
to replace the auditor? 
As noted by Bailey et al. [1987], cognitive modeling has certainly provided 
the dominant justification  for  most expert systems work in auditing, and it is 
the rationale most easily accepted by mainstream accounting researchers. 
We turn now to a less well-known (in accounting) justification  for  construc-
tion and use of  AI tools in this area: the software  engineering rationale. 
3. Software  Engineering Rationale 
In describing the scope of  empirical  AI (as opposed to applied  AI)  endeavors 
and in contrasting its methodological differences  with those of  traditional be-
havioral science, Cohen and Howe observe that: "Whereas... much research 
in the behavioral sciences is concerned with teasing apart the components 
of  behavior and their causal interrelationships, empirical AI is concerned with 
putting those components together in one box to produce behavior" [1988, 
p. 18]. These researchers go on to say that the task of  empirical AI re-
searchers "is not to find  out [by statistical induction] how the average human 
organism (or organization) works; but rather to build artificial  systems that 
work in particular ways" [p. 19]. By building such systems in carefully  delin-
eated ways, they contend that we can produce useful  generalizations de-
ducible from  explanations of  AI theory. Cohen and Howe's thoughts in this 
regard echo sentiments expressed a number of  years earlier by Newell and 
Simon [1976, p. 126] who contended that the purpose of  AI research was to 
enrich our collective store of  concrete experiences with specific  classes of 
symbolic processing systems and to use that collective store to reason across 
domains about the general characteristics of  intelligence and its methods 
of  implementation. 
Justifications  such as these form  the basis for  what we call the software 
engineering rationale for  AI research in accounting and auditing. Stated dif-
ferently,  we believe that efforts  aimed at building knowledge-based systems 
in new and innovative ways in previously unexplored task areas can quite le-
gitimately be viewed as research even if  the results of  such efforts  do not strongly 
mimic the behavior of  a human expert in that particular domain. In the sub-
sections that follow,  we explore different  heuristic frameworks  that can be used 
to classify  endeavors in this vein as either research or development. 
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The March Framework 
In a speech given at ICIS-88, Sal March (the present editor of  Computing 
Surveys)  outlined his framework  for  identifying  information  technology issues 
for  information  systems researchers. That framework  is reproduced in Fig-
ure 1, and his explanation is given below [March, 1988]: 
My general framework  for  research in information  technology is 
two dimensional. The first  dimension is an engineering paradigm: build 
an artifact  to perform  a particular task, evaluate  the performance  of 
that artifact  (develop performance  measures and collect data to eval-
uate those measures), and prove the performance  of  the artifact  (su-
perior to another tool or optimal in some sense). The second dimension 
is a problem solving (methodological) paradigm: representation  of  the 
problem within its domain, development of  methods  utilizing the rep-
resentation to solve the problem, and tools  to instantiate the method. 
In order to build a tool to solve a problem, a representation of  the 
problem must be developed along with a solution method to instanti-
ate. The building of  tools based on given problem representations and 
methods typically does not qualify  as research unless it is the first  tool 
to be developed, in which case the research question is feasibility:  can 
the representation and method be instantiated into a viable tool? 
Similarly, for  building representations and methods, the research 
issues involve building new or substantially  different  representations 
and methods. Simply being "different"  or "novel" may classify  work 
as "research" (depending on how novel it is), however, the burden is 
normally on the researcher to demonstrate that the new representa-
tion or method is "better" than existing ones. The evaluate and prove 
columns of  the framework  addresses this issue. 
To adequately evaluate representations, methods, or tools, the re-
searcher must develop measures of  performance.  These must address 
the key issues of  the problem domain and the solution approach. The 
researcher then evaluates these measures for  various representations, 
methods, and tools to provide a performance  comparison. This type of 
work is typically empirical. It develops case by case comparisons until 
the discipline has decided upon a standard set of  measures. 
Given a standard set of  evaluation criteria, research can then pro-
ceed to prove the quality of  representations, methods, and tools. 
Proofs  may be in the form  of  "optimality" of  the solution or superior-
ity of  the representation, method, or tool (where the evaluation mea-
sures define  the optimization or comparison criteria). 
If  we apply the March framework  and explanation to proposed new work 
in knowledge-based audit systems, they give us strong guidelines for  differ-
entiating research from  development or empirical AI from  applied AI. As he 
infers,  building a new tool for  a task isn't really research unless the methods 
or representations change substantially or unless the researcher can demon-
strate performance  on well-developed evaluation metrics. For an audit re-
searcher today, novel representations might include new structures (such as 
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FIGURE 1 
THE MARCH FRAMEWORK 
SOURCE: MARCH (1988) 
advanced forms  of  semantic networks [Winston, 1984]) and new problem-
solving architectures (such as heuristic classification  [Clancey, 1985]). Novel 
methods might encompass the use of  new learning algorithms or the discovery 
of  innovative knowledge acquisition techniques. Moving across to the eval-
uate and prove columns would mean building new systems that are demon-
strably better on tasks such as causal explanations or default  reasoning. 
Domain Specificity  and Maturity of  the Research Field 
According to the March framework,  building a new tool with established 
representations and methods teeters on the research-development fence  un-
less one is clearly the first  person to do something in the area. We believe 
that judgments of  novelty in this arena can be clarified  by considering both 
the domain specificity  of  the new effort  and the maturity of  the particular re-
search field  (or sub-field)  in which that effort's  exposition is to take place. 
These considerations are discussed below. 
Specificity  and maturity considerations are illustrated with hierarchies in 
Figure 2 whose roots are very general and whose leaves are audit procedures 
specialized down to the task and firm  level. As with all research, the more 
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general one's conclusions are, the better; so staying up in the tree is desir-
able. In the three-dimensional plane of  this figure,  we have illustrated the age 
of  the research sub-field.  Our point in accounting for  time variability is that 
we believe that the proper set of  research activities changes as a field  ma-
tures. What is acceptable in an emerging area as exploratory research will 
often  be deemed far  less noteworthy as cumulative results dictate new di-
rections. 
For the proposer of  a new audit expert system today, these time se-
quenced hierarchies carry some important considerations. For instance, just 
finding  an unexplored node and building a tool which uses established rep-
resentations and methods is clearly not innovative enough unless the task is 
at a sufficiently  high level of  generality to warrant reassessment of  the lessons 
learned from  building entire classes of  previous systems. In a like manner, 
exploratory programming of  a new niche or sub-tree becomes less innova-
tive as time goes on because March's research question of  feasibility  has been 
resolved. In both of  these cases, the systems efforts  being proposed would 
fall  under the headings of  development or applied AI. 
Research and Development Delineation in Prototype Systems 
A fully  functional  expert system involves considerably more development 
effort  than research effort,  and designers will find  that the new knowledge 
gained from  building system components will decrease dramatically as the 
project progresses. Actually, prototyping to a proof  of  feasibility  is the essence 
of  research in AI tools, a fact  illustrated by McCarthy, Rockwell, and Walling-
ford  [1989] in their task complexity hierarchy of  Figure 3. 
When a new AI system is proposed, assessing its ultimate feasibility  in-
volves the following: 
a. breaking the operation of  the entire new system into its component 
procedures and arranging those components into a structured hi-
erarchy like Figure 3, 
b. assessing the relative implementation difficulty  of  the top level 
components and choosing the most complex module for  further  in-
vestigation, 
c. implementing a prototype of  that chosen module down to its full  depth 
of  complexity, and 
d. assessing overall feasibility  by combining estimates of  both width 
and depth of  effort  from  the preliminary structuring of  the overall 
task and from  the results of  the prototyping efforts. 
Empirical AI (research) would stop at this proof  of  feasibility  unless there 
was clear evidence that further  overall complexity (unrelated to individual 
module complexity/simplicity) might be introduced by full  implementation 
of  factors  such as scaling problems. Applied AI (development) on the other 
hand would continue with implementation of  the other components. Little new 
knowledge would be revealed by the development efforts,  but the entire pro-
ject would move closer to actual practical use in a cost-beneficial  way. 
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[Source: Adapted from McCarthy, Rockwell, and Wallingford (1989)] 
FIGURE 3 
PROTOTYPE MODULE STRUCTURE 
Summary of  Software  Engineering Rationale 
In their famous  Turing Award Lecture of  1975, Newell and Simon [1976, 
p.114] spoke of  the confusion  surrounding the scope of  basic research in com-
puter science: 
Computer science is an empirical discipline.... Each new program 
that is built is an experiment. It poses a question to nature, and its be-
havior offers  clues to an answer. Neither machines nor programs are 
black boxes: they are artifacts  that have been designed, both hardware 
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and software,  and we can open them up and look inside. We can re-
late their structure to their behavior and draw many lessons from  a 
single experiment.... We build computers and programs for  many rea-
sons. We build them to serve society and as tools for  carrying out the 
economic tasks of  society. But as basic scientists, we build machines 
and programs as a way of  discovering new phenomena and analyzing 
phenomena we already know about. Society often  becomes confused 
about this, believing that computers and programs are to be con-
structed only for  the economic use that can be made of  them (or as 
intermediate items in a developmental sequence leading to such use). 
It needs to understand that the phenomena surrounding computers 
are deep and obscure, requiring much experimentation to assess their 
nature. It needs to understand that, as in any science, the gains that 
accrue from  such experimentation and understanding pay off  in the 
permanent acquisition of  new techniques; and that it is these techniques 
that will create the instruments to help society in achieving its goals. 
Newell and Simon summarize well our viewpoint about AI research in ac-
counting from  a software  engineering perspective. Building new software  sys-
tems that operate in innovative ways and that provide new insight constitutes 
significant  research activity as does the process of  creating or applying new 
methodologies, representations, and methods that facilitate  the construc-
tion of  such novel software  systems. Computer software  in general and, AI 
programming in particular, can legitimately be defended  as the end goal of 
accounting research, not just as a means to some other end such as the test 
of  a certain behavioral or economic theory. 
4. Some Research/Development Examples 
In the previous two sections of  the paper, we have outlined in preliminary 
fashion  some heuristic frameworks  which can be used to assess the research 
content of  a proposed Al-based audit tool. In this section, we will demonstrate 
the use of  those frameworks  in exploring the time- lined development of  four 
academic audit expert systems. We intend also to highlight their evaluation 
by contrasting their research content with three bogus expert systems. We 
have tentatively designated these bogus systems as YAK-BATs (Yet Another 
Knowledge-Based Auditing Tool), and they serve as prime straw men for  our 
research/development differentiation  arguments. 
Our example audit systems are displayed in the box in Figure 4 that por-
trays empirical  AI systems as bubbling up and above the dotted line sepa-
rating research and development and applied  AI systems as gravitating down. 
The four  real systems are AUDITOR [Dungan and Chandler, 1985], AUDIT-
PLANNER [Steinbart, 1987], GC-X [Selfridge  and Biggs, 1988], and IRE [Pe-
ters, 1989]. The three bogus systems are YAK-BAT-1, YAK-BAT-2, and 
YAK-BAT- 3; and we have positioned these straw men at particular time in-
tervals purposely to highlight the types of  proposed work properly classified 
as development. General features  of  each system are given in order below. 
AUDITOR: This was a simple rule-based system that used a linear weight-
ing system to assess the adequacy of  a client's allowance for  bad debts. It was 
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FIGURE 4 
ACADEMIC SYSTEMS: RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT 
the first  publicized application of  knowledge-based methods and represen-
tations to the domain of  auditing, and it was certainly a pioneering research 
effort.  The system was developed and validated with a set of  working audi-
tors. 
YAKBAT-1: At the nascent stage of  the audit expert system field  in 1984-
85, it would be hard to think of  a proposed project which would not have shed 
some new light of  knowledge on the area. However, if  someone had proposed 
to use a known development shell on a fairly  low level task using well-
understood methods of  knowledge acquisition, we would consider that as 
sinking below the R&D surface.  This would be especially true if  there was 
no attempt made at emulation of  an acknowledged expert and/or validation. 
In those cases, the developer would simply have been using the technology 
for  automation of  ad hoc decision-making heuristics. 
AUDIT-PLANNER: This was a rule-based system with a much more com-
plex control structure than AUDITOR. AUDIT-PLANNER was truly a cog-
nitive model of  one individual's expertise in the area of  materiality judgments, 
so its research contribution is unquestioned. It was validated with subordi-
nate auditors of  the same firm.  The representations and methods used in build-
ing the system were well known, but the task was fairly  high on the domain 
hierarchy. 
YAKBAT-2: Steinbart's system circumscribed the entire materiality de-
cision very well, and it was essentially self-contained  in the sense that a con-
sultation with AUDIT-PLANNER elicited a set of  environmental cues from  a 
user and used those cues in its goal of  producing a materiality judgment. A 
tool developed later that would have concentrated heavily on the less com-
plex development branches (such as tuning the user interface)  or that would 
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have used the same rule-oriented representations to emulate a lower level 
audit task would fall  into the development or applied AI compartment. 
GC-X: The Selfridge  and Biggs going concern expert system introduced 
the complex representations of  semantic networks. They also demonstrated 
the complicated interactions between audit task knowledge and client domain 
knowledge that had long been thought to be an important ingredient of  audit 
expertise. 
YAK-BAT-3: This might be a frame-based  or rule-based expert system which 
would lack the domain richness of  GC-X. Certainly at this point in time, sim-
ple implementations of  somewhat specific  judgment tasks would lend little 
new insight to the field,  unless the tool could be moved over to the evalua-
tion or prove columns of  the March framework. 
IRE: The Inherent Risk Evaluator used complex representations of  both 
firm  specific  and general business knowledge along with specific  predictions 
derived from  analytical review rules to assess risk for  audit planning. The sys-
tem was validated carefully  on three sets of  case data, and its cognitive mod-
eling intent is quite clear. 
The research viability of  each real system discussed above is widely (but 
not universally) acknowledged in the auditing community. Their developers 
undoubtedly would cast them first  as cognitive models, but they all display 
innovation in a software  development sense also. Certainly, researchers 
would be wise to concentrate on the more widely accepted behavioral science 
rationale in their development of  proposed new projects. We remain convinced 
however that the technology-oriented rationale of  the prior section constitutes 
an additional basis on which to plan new work. 
5. The Accounting Firm Perspective 
As has been explained, research efforts  concentrate on pursuing more 
accurate representations or models of  cognitive processes while improving 
the methods for  evaluating the representation methods themselves. There-
fore,  academic efforts  focusing  on the particular use of  previously explored 
frameworks  are best characterized as development rather than research 
given our discussion to this point. 
Unlike academic researchers, professional  firms  tend not to be concerned 
about whether a particular project is characterized as research or develop-
ment. Rather, firms  focus  primarily on enhancing the efficiency  and effec-
tiveness of  audit practice instead of  understanding low level cognitive 
processes, exploring complex instances of  judgement, or developing formal 
methods of  evaluating concepts. This interest typically results in accounting 
firms  applying artificial  intelligence technology along two fronts:  (1) au-
tomating clerical or low level audit judgement tasks and (2) leveraging firm 
or individual expertise. 
Notwithstanding the profession's  disinterest in distinguishing between 
research and development, these projects often  result in significant  contri-
butions to academic research efforts.  Graphically, the results of  AI work 
amongst the firms  might be characterized as shown in Figure 5. Although 
the major portion of  a particular firm  project will likely be characterized as 
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FIGURE 5 
ACCOUNTING FIRM SYSTEMS; 
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT 
development, a portion of  the effort  could legitimately be considered a re-
search contribution. 
The Contribution of  Practice to AI Research 
In a nutshell, we see practice efforts  providing two contributions to AI re-
search. First, the firms  may propose and utilize novel methods and repre-
sentations as well as provide well- developed metrics for  evaluation of  those 
methods and representations; and second, they expose the weaknesses of 
scalability of  academic theories and ideas. 
During the past few  years, a number of  firms  have released various ex-
pert systems which are in use today. To a limited extent, some of  these sys-
tems have provided a contribution to AI research by providing improved 
representation and evaluation methods. For illustrative purposes, we will 
briefly  review the contribution of  Coopers & Lybrand's new audit tool Risk 
AdvisorSM. 
As Graham, Damens, and Van Ness [1990] explain, "Risk AdvisorSM is 
an expert system based on the knowledge and experience of  senior audit and 
consulting professionals.  It is used by auditors to enhance the risk assess-
ment process through the systematic capture and analysis of  a wide range 
of  financial  information  and other data to allow the timely identification  of  audit 
and business issues." The system captures, analyzes, and reports informa-
tion ranging from  standard client, industry, and economy-wide financial  in-
formation  to qualitative information  captured through dialogue with the 
system. The system is utilized during audit planning to identify  and document 
potential audit risks and management issues which are important to the 
audit. Additionally, the system assists in analyzing whether appropriate ac-
tion is taken in response to the issues raised by the system during the plan-
ning process. 
Risk AdvisorSM certainly provides useful  contributions to the issues of 
knowledge acquisition from  more than one expert, knowledge representa-
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tion, and human/computer interaction. However, we believe the larger con-
tribution of  projects such as these lie more in their ability to address the "toy 
world" problems which have plagued academic efforts  for  years. 
Although execution of  a computational model serves a "proof  of  concept 
or feasibility"  which academics have used as their primary evaluation tool, 
the proof  is still susceptible to weaknesses of  scalability such as those often 
revealed by the overly simplistic application of  exhaustive search methods. 
Upon being tested in realistic decision support scenarios, the solutions of-
fered  by auditing academics sometimes prove insufficient  for  addressing 
problems in the real world. As Waterman [1986, p. 27] states, "When gross 
simplifying  assumptions are made about a complex problem, and its data, the 
resulting solution may not scale up to the point where it's applicable to the 
real problem." Projects such as those by Coopers & Lybrand certainly pro-
vide a test of  the scalability of  academic theories and thereby result in feed-
back to the academic community as to the adequacy of  academic research. 
Practitioners and Academics Working Together -
The Optimal Solution 
The primary contribution of  academic researchers in any field  is the low 
cost application of  analytical skills to problem solving. However, when aca-
demic efforts  are isolated from  the real world problems faced  by practition-
ers, the usefulness  of  the research wanes. Conversely, practitioners face 
real, complex, and important problems daily which can prove costly if  not ob-
jectively studied in a timely fashion. 
The logical conclusion to an analysis of  academic and practice efforts  in 
the use of  AI is that the two should work together. Such a consortium could 
possibly result in significant  enhancements to audit practice by providing sound 
solutions to real problems which have been carefully  scrutinized without the 
pressure of  the practice environment. To the extent that academics and prac-
titioners can enhance audit practice while also increasing our understanding 
of  audit judgement, significant  contributions can be expected. 
The reality of  the situation however, highlights significant  challenges to 
developing working relationships between practitioners and academics. The 
strategic nature of  AI projects tends to encourage confidentiality  of  project re-
sults at least in the short run while the firm  realizes the rewards of  being the 
"first-mover"  with a new idea. Such a practice is diametrically opposite to the 
nature of  the academic environment which attempts to distribute project re-
sults in a much more timely fashion  in order to encourage additional research. 
Although differences  are obvious, they are no greater than those faced 
in many of  the physical and engineering sciences in which universities and 
organizations work together on more sensitive issues of  national security as 
opposed to simpler marketing or operational advantages. We believe that any 
challenges can be overcome once practitioners and academics recognize 
the mutual benefit  of  working together. 
6. Summary 
This paper has reviewed the progress of  knowledge-based research pro-
jects in auditing, primarily in the academic section of  the field.  We outlined 
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some heuristic rules and frameworks  against which a proposed new audit tool 
could be evaluated and classified  as either fundamental  research or practi-
cal development. We readily admit that certain types of  expert systems are 
like COBOL payroll programs in the sense that they are simple computational 
exercises that add little to fundamental  knowledge. Building software  systems 
which make marginal  improvements with known  approaches in established 
domains is definitely  development activity, while building software  systems 
which make significant  improvements with novel approaches in unexplored 
domains is most certainly research. The difficulty  of  classification  lies in the 
middle which is where we have concentrated our discussion. Academic re-
searchers can follow  our guidelines in trying to stay above the research-de-
velopment surface. 
We remain very optimistic that work in this particular field  will continue 
to grow, along with knowledge-based research in other areas of  accounting 
as well. Expertise in professional  judgment will always be a scarce com-
modity on both public and corporate accounting staffs,  and AI research meth-
ods continue to offer  promising avenues for  both explanation and leveraging 
of  that expertise. The problems are interesting, the cognate field  (AI) set of 
solutions and research methods continue to grow, and the auditing practice 
imperative for  efficiency  and effectiveness  remains high. 
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